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Introduction 
 
 
It has long been the received wisdom among international lawyers that the natural course of 
historical progression for the international legal system entails a process of steady but ever-
deepening judicialization of international dispute settlement (IDS). The more developed and 
more sophisticated the international legal system became, the more ubiquitous would become 
the use of international judicial mechanisms, the more decisively the centre of gravity in IDS 
would move away from what in other legal systems would be considered alternative dispute 
resolution structures towards some form of litigative or quasi-litigative procedure.  
 
Whether this theory was ever justified as a matter of factual historical record, remains, of 
course, in considerable doubt. Latterly, however, it seems, in addition to everything else, it 
has come on hard times also as a matter of international policy vision – nowhere more so 
vividly, perhaps, than in the field of international economic law. The remarkable decision by 
the German government in March 2014 to push for the exclusion of any form of investor-
state IDS mechanism from the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement 
provides only the most recent illustration of what seems to be a gradually spreading trend.1  
 
This emergent pattern of deep-seated ambivalence concerning the use of judicial IDS 
mechanisms has not, of course, remained the sole provenance of international investment law 
policymakers. Over the last few years, indeed, it seems to have become a rather familiar 
theme in various international trade law (ITL) circles as well. The ongoing attempt since the 
middle of the last decade to reform the standard procedures for the ‘facilitation of solutions to 
non-tariff barriers’ in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO) – the so-called 
Horizontal Mechanism (HM) initiative – offers a brilliant case in point.  
 
In this essay I propose to address some of the issues raised by the emergence of the HM 
initiative and the respective transformations in the ITL consciousness which it seems to 
reflect. More specifically, I am going to describe a number of fundamental challenges which 
the rise of the HM initiative seems to have uncovered within the broader structure of the ITL 
project, challenges that I am going to argue are not, in fact, at all exclusive to the ITL field as 
such but are, indeed, characteristic of the entire enterprise of contemporary international law 
as a whole.2  
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A large part of the argument I am going to sketch out in these pages is fairly unoriginal. What 
it lacks in terms of originality, however, it tries to make up for in terms of its theoretical 
urgency. It seems to me truly extraordinary how little attention has been paid in the broader 
doctrinal and policymaking debates that have sprung around the question of the HM initiative 
in recent years – and more generally in contemporary ITL as a whole – to the kind of issues 
and insights which the sort of analysis outlined here helps identify and articulate. Given how 
relevant these insights are for other areas of international economic governance too, this 
pattern of omission seems both baffling and suggestive of a rather worrying trend.  
 
Since the theoretical intervention that I would like to make in this essay is not intended to 
double as a literature review, I have refrained from discussing in these pages every single 
piece of writing that seeks to make a contribution to the HM ‘debate’. For the purposes of the 
argument that I wanted to make here, it was sufficient to focus only on the most characteristic 
representative of the genre.3 This I found in a recent article written by Veronique Fraser.4 
This choice, inevitably, is not immune to challenges. But then neither is any other 
interpretative decision, and this one at least has the merit of being transparent.5   
 
 
 
A Brief Genealogy of the HM Initiative 
 
 
 
The basic timeline behind the HM initiative looks as follows.  
 
Building on the various successes of the previous decades, in 2001, WTO members embarked 
on a new round of multilateral trade negotiation (the so-called Doha Round). One of the 
central concerns placed on the negotiators’ agenda was the spread of the so-called non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) in international trade. Though a clearly defined substantive conception of 
NTBs had proved traditionally impossible to work out – even today the standard definition 
vacillates between the decidedly elastic ‘any policy measures other than tariffs that can 
impact trade flows’6 and a somewhat more functional but still very broad ‘all non-tax 
measures imposed by governments to favour domestic over foreign suppliers’7 – the 
commitment to address the mischief caused by these trade-restrictive mechanisms remained 
firm.  
 
The common assumption established at the time held that for decades NTBs had not played a 
significant role in international trade. The reason this stopped being the case was the 
continuing success of the GATT/WTO enterprise. The progressive development of the GATT 
disciplines relating to tariffs over the previous decades had steadily increased the relative 
attractiveness of other instruments of protectionism. Because, unlike tariffs, NTBs 
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historically have tended to be fundamentally non-transparent in their purpose and effects, and 
because in many cases their application could be easily justified on grounds that formally had 
nothing to do with trade, their trade-distortive potential was quickly realised both by 
governments and the various special interests clamouring trade protection.8 The use of NTBs 
increased. What is more, it also became progressively more sophisticated: if prior to the 
Uruguay Round NTBs most commonly took the form of import quotas, voluntary export 
restraint agreements, and non-automatic import licenses, the post-Uruguay trend has seen the 
use of these trade control devices significantly diminished in favour of other, less easily 
quantifiable and analysable mechanisms.9  
 
Even though the empirical evidence in its support was not unequivocal, the common 
impression by the start of the new century thus became that the centre of gravity in NTB 
practices had increasingly shifted away from the relatively easy to trace measures, such as 
quotas and non-automatic licenses – what one might call old-style NTBs – towards the 
fundamentally more difficult to ‘expose’ instruments, such as technical standards, customs 
procedures, and SPS measures10– the new-style NTBs – devices which, because of their 
mixed legitimation dynamics, were, furthermore, even more difficult to measure for their 
trade-distortive effects in practice.11  
 
In response to such developments, an entirely new policy initiative framework, it was 
decided, had to be put in place. As part of this framework and in furtherance of the Doha 
Round’s more comprehensive vision for trade liberalisation a special Negotiating Group on 
Market Access for Non-agricultural Products (NAMA) was established in early 2002. 
Designed to serve, among other things, as the WTO’s primary institutional locus for all work 
aimed at the reduction or elimination of NTBs in the WTO context, NAMA’s efforts in the 
area to date have proceeded along two main avenues: the identification, categorization, and 
examination of the different types of NTBs used in current global practice and the 
development of corresponding solutions and approaches to NTB negotiations.12   
 
In the course of its work the group has prepared a number of comprehensive negotiations 
proposals – the so-called NAMA modalities – the most recent of which was issued on 6 
December 2008.  The aim of such proposals is to set out a draft roadmap for the subsequent 
negotiations on market access that would be followed by the WTO members. An important 
source of inspiration in determining the content of these draft roadmaps have been the 
individual proposals and initiatives submitted by various participating member states or 
groups of member states.  
 
The HM initiative, originally proposed by the so-called NAMA-11 group and the European 
Communities, was first entered into this process of policy collation in May 2006.13 After 
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undergoing a series of variously significant amendments, it found its most commonly 
recognisable shape in a reformulated proposal sponsored by some 88 WTO member states 
that was tabled on 3 February 2010.14 It is this version of the HM ‘vision’ that remains today 
at the focus of the respective doctrinal debates.  
 
 
 
The Internal Structure of the HM Discourse 
 
 
 
Most discussions of the HM initiative follow the same script: they adopt a conspicuously 
technocratic tone, they present arguments light on history and hard data, and they build their 
narrative structures around three principal themes.  
 
The first theme addresses the question of the overall purpose behind the HM initiative. 
According to the standard account, the principal objective of introducing the new mechanism 
is to ‘assist in the resolution of NTB disputes’, and the general presumption behind this is that 
this aim can be best attained by inserting the new IDS mechanism within the already existing 
procedural setup, rather than by establishing some new procedural channel.15 The basic 
conception thus outlined projects an impression of a policy programme geared towards 
evolution, organic growth, and modest piecemeal reform, but never radical reconstruction: 
‘[t]he topic seems to be too complex for a “big solution”’, runs the common refrain.16 The 
spirit of radicalism and sweeping utopian visions has no place in the NTB landscape. A 
pragmatic approach grounded in a realistic set of ambitions is the order of the day. 
 
The second theme concerns the question of what sort of immediate institutional arrangements 
would best serve to realise this conception in practice. Two main points are commonly 
stressed in these discussions: (i) the new mechanism should work exclusively on the basis of 
the principle of consent, and the search for mutually acceptable solutions should remain the 
key priority at all stages; and (ii) to assist the parties in developing such solutions, it would be 
a good idea, after an initial stage of bilateral consultations, to introduce into the picture some 
kind of independent facilitator.  
 
The basic setup that is reflected in the 2010 version of the HM proposal17 reflects this vision 
as follows: at the first stage of the proceedings, the parties would be given the chance to 
resolve the matter between themselves bilaterally. The requesting member would have to 
submit in writing a request for information concerning a specific NTB to the responding 
member: the request should detail the immediate measure in question but also explain the 
grounds for the requesting member’s concerns (§6). The responding member would then 
have up to twenty days to prove a written response (§7), a copy of which together with the 
copy of the request would be passed on to the respective WTO Committee to be circulated to 
the WTO membership (§8). If at that point, the requesting state’s concerns still remain 
                                                                                                                                                        
Communities, ‘Negotiating Proposal on WTO Means to Reduce the Risk of Future NTBs and to Facilitate Their 
Resolution’, TN/MA/W/11/Add.8 (1 May 2006).  
14 See WTO, Negotiating Group on Market Access, ‘Ministerial Decision on Procedures for the Facilitation of 
Solutions to Non-Tariff Barriers’, TN/MA/W/106/Rev.1 (3 February 2010). 
15 Fraser, supra n.4, 1040.  
16 Terhechte, supra n.7, para. 18.  
17 See supra n.14. 
unresolved, and if both the requesting state and the responding state so agree, the proceedings 
would progress to the second stage (§9) and an independent facilitator would be appointed 
(§12). The parties can request the chairperson of the relevant Committee or one of the vice-
chairpersons to serve as the facilitator, or agree on an entirely external candidature who 
would serve in the capacity of ‘a friend of the chair’ (§12). If the parties cannot agree on who 
should serve as the facilitator, the chairperson of the relevant Committee may, upon request 
by one of the parties, appoint the facilitator him or herself (§12). Obviously, if the other party 
would not be content with the choice, it could always request that the proceedings be 
terminated altogether (§11bis). The facilitator’s principal functions would include organizing 
the meetings between the parties, consulting on their behalf with the relevant WTO 
structures, offering advice, and proposing possible solutions (§15). In fulfilling these 
functions, the facilitator would be entitled to receive any information from either of the 
parties as well as from the relevant WTO structures, experts and stakeholders whom he or she 
would be entitled to consult, subject to the parties’ agreement (§15). All meetings and 
information acquired in this process would be treated as confidential and would not be 
subject to prejudicial use in any future WTO judicial proceedings (§17). All in all, the second 
stage would last up to sixty days from the date of the appointment of the facilitator (§16). 
Whether or not in the end a satisfactory resolution would be achieved, the facilitator would 
prepare an independent factual report, outlining the issues raised during the discussions and 
the solutions proposed thereto. The report, with the accompanying comments from the 
parties, would then be passed on to the relevant WTO Committee and added to the record 
(§18). At no point would this report be treated as providing a commentary on the parties’ 
legal position or an interpretation of the WTO Agreement (§18). 
 
It is unclear to what extent the authors of the 2010 proposal consciously took into account 
what one might call the traditional dogmas of IDS theory. However, it seems quite 
remarkable how closely the proposed setup reflects the conventional accounts of mediation 
and conciliation adopted in the classical IDS doctrine. Consider, for instance, what the latter 
typically has to say on the subject of mediation:  
 
By accepting mediation, a government acknowledges that its dispute is a 
legitimate matter of international concern. If, therefore, a question of international 
accountability lies at the heart of the controversy, … mediation will be out of the 
question. Moreover, a mediated settlement is always likely to be a compromise of 
some kind. [Thus, m]ediation is likely to be particularly relevant when a dispute 
has progressed to a stage which compels the parties to rethink their policies. A 
stalemate is clearly one such situation; another is when the parties come to 
recognise that the risks of continuing a dispute outweigh the costs of trying to end 
it. … The value of mediation as a source of information should not be overstated. 
… There is … no guarantee that the information brought by a mediator [, e.g., in 
the form of a final report] will always be believed; nevertheless, its presence will 
certainly tend to discourage wishful thinking, while sometimes providing critics 
of official policy (whose pressures may be important in encouraging a settlement) 
with a source of valuable intelligence.18 
 
The parallels with the 2010 proposal are numerous and very easy to spot. The consistent 
foregrounding of compromise; resistance towards any prospects of allowing the question of 
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accountability and thus of legal status to be raised at any point during the proceedings;19 the 
introduction of a two-stage process to prepare the ground for the ‘rethinking of the policies’; 
the insistence on the publication of the mediator’s report and the treatment of (partial) 
transparency as a good in itself – one almost gets the sense that the authors of the 2010 
proposal made a conscious effort to make it look like it had been ‘written by the book’.  
 
Nor is that all. Consider now how the IDS doctrine typically conceptualises conciliation: 
 
One view is that it is to be regarded as a kind of institutionalised negotiation. The 
task of the [conciliator] is to encourage and structure the parties’ dialogue, while 
providing them with whatever assistance may be necessary to bring it to a 
successful conclusion. This approach, which proceeds from the premise that the 
resolution of disputes depends on securing the parties’ agreement, finds an affinity 
between conciliation and mediation … A [conciliator] has a duty to examine the 
nature and background of a dispute and so is usually equipped with wide powers of 
investigation. Unlike an inquiry, however, whose whole raison d’être is to 
illuminate the dispute, a [conciliator] has as [his] objective the parties’ conciliation. 
[His] investigative powers are thus simply a means to an end. As a result, if it 
becomes apparent that the exposure of some matter might make conciliation more 
difficult, that line of investigation is unlikely to be pursued. … [O]ne of the 
distinctive features of conciliation is that [the final] report takes the form of a set of 
proposals, not a decision. Thus, even in cases where law has been a major 
consideration, the report is quite different from an arbitral award and not binding 
on the parties. This feature of conciliations [presents] something of a dilemma. On 
the one hand, [the conciliators] wish to make their proposals as persuasive as 
possible by supporting them with reasons; on the other hand, they are unwilling to 
provide the parties with legal arguments or findings of facts that may be cited in 
subsequent litigation. [Nevertheless, it has to be noted that, as a mechanism of IDS, 
c]onciliation has so far proved most useful for disputes where the main issues are 
legal, but the parties desire an equitable compromise. [B]ecause of the way 
conciliation is conducted – through a dialogue with and between the parties – there 
is no danger of it producing a result that takes the parties completely by surprise, as 
sometimes happens in legal proceedings. Secondly a [conciliator’s] proposals … 
are not binding and, if unacceptable, can be rejected. 20 
 
The parallels, once more, are rather difficult to overlook: an equitable resolution for issues 
that are legal in character; a final report that is all about outlining proposals and not 
preparing the ground for subsequent litigation; proposals that are all about persuasion but are 
not binding; considerable independent investigative powers subject to the understanding that 
if the parties are not happy about a certain line of investigation (e.g. the use of a certain group 
of independent experts), it should be immediately abandoned.  
 
Now, this is not at all a certain fact – and it most definitely is not the only thing that is 
probably happening beneath the surface of the HM initiative – but it seems to me that one 
very possible scenario that needs to be considered at this point, in trying to explain this turn 
to ‘writing by the book’, is that the more successfully the authors of the 2010 proposal have 
managed to express the idea that the HM proposal they were sponsoring had been modelled 
on the traditional concepts of mediation and conciliation, the more successfully they would 
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thereby have also conveyed the message that it was not at the same time intended to be 
considered under the rubric of the judicial IDS.  
 
In a sense, this is basic Saussurean semiotics in action: since all meaning is relational, i.e. 
derived from the logic of differences and oppositions (‘A’ is that which is both not ‘-A’ and 
not ‘non A’),21 the easiest way to ensure that one’s audience does not get the impression that 
one is talking of a certain phenomenon would be to use persistently those vocabularies which 
in the mind of this audience are associated with the exactly opposite phenomena.  
 
In the internal conceptual taxonomy adopted by the traditional IDS theory, both mediation 
and conciliation operate as categories whose basic identity is defined to a very large extent 
through their distance from, and dissimilarity to, arbitration and judicial settlement, i.e. the 
judicial IDS mechanisms. Looking at the standard patterns of the HM discourse from this 
angle, the consistent deployment of the classical tropes of mediation-ism and conciliation-ism 
suddenly seems not at all unrelated to the regular invocation in the same context of the idea 
that ‘whatever the outcome, the HM procedure will neither address nor alter the legal 
positions of the parties’. For, indeed, even the briefest scrutiny of the broader HM discourse 
suggests that this motif is not of episodic importance.  
 
**** 
 
The third theme around which most of the discussions in the contemporary HM debate 
revolve has for its focus the question of the general strategy of institution-building, that is to 
say, the overall plan on the basis of which all those practical details outlined above have been 
developed.  
 
This plan, in a nutshell, seems to consist of two chief elements, each of which is defined in 
terms of a fundamental end-goal to be achieve through the institution of the new mechanism.  
 
The first goal is the improvement of the existing institutional potential of the respective WTO 
Committees. The strategic plan envisages that the new procedures would be carried out 
strictly within the limits of the established WTO Committee framework and would apply ‘to 
any non-tariff measure that is within the remit of a covered WTO Committee’, which is 
defined as the Committee charged with ‘overseeing the operation of the WTO agreement 
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that “concepts … are defined not positively, in terms of their content, but negatively by contrast with other items 
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initially seem mystifying if not perverse, but the concept of negative differentiation becomes clearer if we 
consider how we might teach someone who did not share our language what we mean by the term “red”. We 
would be unlikely to make our point by simply showing that person a range of different objects which all 
happened to be red – we would probably do better to single out a red object from a set of objects which were 
identical in all respects except colour.’ (Ibid., 21.)  
most closely related to the measure at issue’; if no such Committee exists for the particular 
class of measures, the coordinating structure will be the Council for Trade Goods.22  
 
The second goal set out in the strategic plan is the facilitation of the emergence of a more 
efficient multilateral process of information gathering, discussion, and negotiations that will 
not lead to any kind of ‘legalistic evaluation’ of the member states’ rights and obligations 
under the respective parts of the WTO agreement.  
 
Note the double emphasis: the 2009 briefing paper23 prepared on behalf of the then coalition 
of sponsors (its composition has since changed) puts a very clear premium on the idea that 
the resolution of any given NTB dispute is not, ultimately, an issue in which only the two 
immediately involved states alone have a valid stake. To resolve the problem of NTBs 
effectively, requires the achievement of the ‘highest possible transparency of procedure’ and 
the balancing of ‘the interests of the [immediate] parties to come to a mutually agreed 
solution’ with the legitimate ‘interests of other WTO members’.24 Although the drafters of 
the paper do not immediately clarify what those legitimate interests might include, from the 
overall context of the discussion it seems clear that the main concern here is to enable the 
creation of an effective regime for the accumulation of information that could be used in the 
future by any member state or the interested WTO structure.25 (Note again the continuous 
pre-occupation with the concept of information gathering; I will return to this point shortly.) 
 
The language of ‘legalistic evaluation’ comes from the same briefing paper. The wording 
may seem a little unusual – the term ‘legalistic’ clearly has pejorative connotations and would 
normally be associated with the writings of Hans Morgenthau, not WTO policy discourse – 
but it is certainly not without wider significance. A close reading of the accompanying 
discussions suggests that the invocation of this phrase is designed to perform two slightly 
different functions in the present context: in the first place, it fixes what seems to be the most 
important element in an otherwise fundamentally vague explanation (see the point about 
semiotics above: the best way to explain what something is to indicate what it is not); in the 
second place, it very efficiently conveys the HM sponsors’ general theory about NTB 
disputes.  
 
What are the main defining elements of this theory? The answer can be gleaned in part from 
an earlier passage in Fraser’s essay:  
 
NTBs are trade barriers that have the effect of restricting imports [but] NTBs 
can [also] serve legitimate objectives and important purposes pursued by 
Member States. They are expressly permitted under the WTO agreements when 
they are deemed to protect human, animal or plant life or health, or the 
environment. … Due to their antagonistic nature, which on one hand serves 
legitimate purposes of governments, and on the other hand, restricts trade, 
NTBs can be the object of many disputes between Member States.26  
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Most of these disputes, continues the argument, are unlikely, however, to be brought forward 
through the standard WTO legal channels – and precisely for the same set of reasons already 
mentioned: many measures which result in the creation of NTBs are adopted for the 
protection of fundamentally important social values the advancement of which is expressly 
permitted under the WTO law. Any attempt to challenge their legitimacy, follows the 
conclusion, is bound to result in such tremendous political acrimony that any potential gains 
will not be worth the costs. As another commentator puts it, ‘in the area of NTBs national 
interests play [such] a pivotal role [that they] often cause States to refrain from formal 
disputes.’27 Lest these latent disputes be allowed to simmer indefinitely, a more informal IDS 
mechanism has to be provided.   
 
Or, at least, that is the basic understanding which the standard account seeks to promote. 
Recall the basic sequence implied by Fraser’s argument: (i) there seems to be something very 
distinctive about NTB disputes themselves as a result of which they tend to become extremely 
resistant to ‘legalistic’ resolution; (ii) this something can be best explained in terms of the 
fact that NTB disputes are characterised by a deeper than usual level of complexity in their 
legitimacy dimension, that is to say, the role of policy considerations in their case seems to be 
far higher than in the case of most other WTO disputes; (iii) ‘legalistic’ institutional 
frameworks are not the best forum for the resolution of policy conflicts; (iv) hence the 
conclusion that a new, more ‘flexible and expeditious procedure[] of a conciliatory and non-
adjudicatory nature’ is needed.28  
 
Now, compare this implied sequence to the actual argument itself. Consider, in particular, the 
loose combination of two sweeping generalisations and a logical leap that are quietly 
imported into the argument structure to enable its smooth progression: surely, it would be 
inaccurate to suggest that all NTB disputes are characterised by the same degree of policy 
indeterminacy, right? Indeed, Fraser’s second comment in the passage quoted above seems to 
recognise exactly that fact, since she writes ‘NTBs can [also] serve legitimate objectives and 
important purposes’. The choice of the verb is not insignificant: not all measures that can, do. 
In her first comment, just before that, Fraser states that all NTB measures have the effect of 
restricting trade. In formal-logical terms, this statement follows the standard formula of a 
universal proposition: all A are B. What Fraser says in her second comment, by contrast, does 
not have the same intonation: all NTB measures can serve legitimate social purposes, which 
means that in practice only some of them do and others do not. The logical formula that is 
deployed here is that of a particular proposition: some A are also C. So far, so clear, but 
notice now how Fraser then goes on to rearrange these two statements at the start of her third 
comment, just before she explains the reasons for why legalistic IDSs are not going to be a 
good forum for NTB disputes: because NTB measures serve legitimate objectives and at the 
same time result in trade restrictions, NTB disputes are likely to give rise to particularly 
acrimonious disputes. Notice the sudden shift from ‘all A are B, and some A are also C’ to 
‘all A are B and all A are also C’. What is going on here?  
 
For starters, it is a basic rule of formal logic that a combination of a universal proposition 
about NTBs and a particular proposition about NTBs cannot yield a logically valid universal 
conclusion about NTBs. If Fraser had not rephrased the basic statement at the heart of her 
second comment when she repeated it at the start of her third comment, she would not have 
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been able to produce a convincing argument about an irresolvable contradiction whence the 
suggestion about particularly awful acrimony would arise. 
 
Furthermore, the proposition that some measures which lead to the creation of NTBs may 
also, under certain circumstances, be used to protect fundamentally legitimate social values is 
valid, strictly speaking, only for a very limited class of such measures. Given the established 
doctrinal consensus, it would be hard to imagine that an old-style NTB, such as an import 
quota or a voluntary export restraint, could ever be recognised as serving a fundamentally 
legitimate (from an ITL point of view) social purpose in the normal course of international 
trade. If there is one thing on which all NTB commentators today seem to agree, it is that 
from the ‘good policy’ point of view, outside situations of extreme economic emergency, 
such devices will have no redeeming features. By the same token, it is equally unclear how 
one could ever make in the same context a convincing argument that the meaning of 
‘fundamentally legitimate social values’ could be extended in such a way as to cover, for 
example, a situation where the importing state changes its customs certification procedure 
from a model that mandates the importer to complete ten separate forms to one that mandates 
the completion of fourteen forms.  
 
None of this is to suggest, of course, that in its general contours Fraser’s proposed 
explanation and the argument constructed in its support do not work. They most certainly do 
– and that is precisely the whole point: like so much else about the NTB discourse, they work 
but only in their general contours, at the most abstract level, that is to say, so long as one 
does not inspect them very closely, trace their logical formulas too diligently, or ask for too 
many practical illustrations and specific examples. An argument that cannot withstand close 
inspection, an explanation that relies on hidden logical slippages for its ability to hold 
together, a discourse that operates smoothly only when it deals in abstract generalities – in the 
critical studies tradition such an arrangement of intellectual conditions is typically taken to be 
a sign that one is getting dragged into the middle of a heavily ideological exercise – in the 
most vulgar sense of the word possible.   
 
 
 
The External Structure of the HM Discourse 
 
 
 
When it comes to the question of addressing any given set of challenges to the enterprise of 
trade liberalisation, the contemporary ITL doctrine recognises three main possibilities.  
 
The first possibility involves the delegation of the respective issue to the respective WTO 
Committees and other similarly placed executive and deliberative structures. This is the 
rubric under which the HM initiative belongs. The popular view holds that this approach 
offers the greatest amount of flexibility, but that it works best when the stakes involved are 
either relatively low (so as not to excite any digging-in of the heels on the part of the involved 
players) or relatively high (so that diplomacy by definition becomes the only realistic option). 
When it comes to situations involving stakes of medium-range proportions, the procedure 
often falters. With regard to the NTB problem, for example, the common impression is often 
that the absence of a stricter operative code in such institutional settings means that ‘the 
discussions over a NTB concern [will typically] occur in an unstructured manner and without 
any timeframe, [which] restrains its potential of being resolved.’29 The statement may seem 
observationally correct. And yet it is, in fact, deeply illogical. It is precisely because these 
settings offer the possibility to the parties concerned to engage in an unstructured discussion 
without any rigid timeframes that these procedures exist at all. To complain about the fact 
that they have these characteristics is, effectively, akin to feeling scandalized that there are no 
goalkeepers in chess or that a violin does not work very well as a hammer. Far more 
importantly, however, one should ask also: what is the evidence on the basis of which the 
claim that the ‘procedure often falters’ is made? What is the benchmark, in other words, 
against which the judgment call that the potential of successful resolution has been 
‘restrained’ by the excessive flexibility of the Committee mechanism is made?  The more 
closely one looks at it, the less convincing the argument seems to become – and not simply 
because such evidence, even if it were provided, would be very difficult to assess since it 
would be at best of anecdotal character. The real question is: what probative value would we 
have to assign to all those cases where no such evidence has been detected? Can the absence 
of a certain pattern of evidence – e.g. a bout of toothache suffered when eating apples or an 
international dispute escalating when dealt with through a flexible committee procedure – 
itself be treated an evidence of something else – viz., that eating apples does not cause 
toothache and the use of flexible committee procedures does not escalate international 
disputes? The analytical dilemma this points to will be familiar to the students of public 
international law: it was exactly this conundrum that formed the central point of contention in 
the famous exchange between Thomas Franck and Louis Henkin in the early 1970s about the 
alleged effectiveness of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.30 Should Article 2(4) be 
considered dead letter because in the years since its adoption so many states have gone to war 
so often?31 Or should it rather be considered a perfectly successful legal regime because so 
many other states that could have gone to war during the same period did not and of those 
that did most have limited the scale of their military operations?32 Deterrence, like deliberate 
omission, is notoriously difficult to measure and to prove. Both interpretations seem, in 
                                                 
29 Ibid.  
30 See Thomas Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 
AJIL 809 (1970); Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AJIL 544 
(1971). 
31 Franck, supra n.30, 810-1: ‘In the twenty-five years since the San Francisco Conference, there have been 
some one hundred separate outbreaks of hostility between states. The fact that on only one of these occasions 
has the United Nations been able to mount a collective enforcement action – and that more by a fluke than by 
dint of organizational responsiveness – indicates why, for security, nations have increasingly fallen back on their 
own resources and on military and regional alliances. [T]he failure of UN enforcement machinery has not been 
occasional but endemic, and so, concomitantly, has the resort to “self-defense”. [S]ince there is usually no way 
for the international system to establish conclusively which state is the aggressor and which the aggrieved, wars 
continue to occur, as they have since time immemorial, between parties both of which are using force allegedly 
in “self-defense”.’ 
32 Henkin, supra n.30, 544: The purpose of Article 2(4) was to establish a norm of national behavior and to help 
deter violation of it. Despite common misimpressions, Article 2(4) has indeed been a norm of behavior and has 
deterred violations. In inter-state as in individual penology, deterrence often cannot be measured or even proved, 
but students of politics agree that traditional war between nations has become less frequent and less likely. The 
sense that war is not done has taken hold, and nations more readily find that their interests do not in fact require 
the use of force at all. Expectations of international violence no longer underlie every political calculation of 
every nation, and war plans lie buried in national files. Even where force is used, the fact that it is unlawful 
cannot be left out of account and limits the scope, the weapons, the duration, the purposes for which force is 
used. Of the “some one hundred separate outbreaks of hostilities” to which Dr. Franck refers, less than fingers-
full became “war” or successful conquest, and hundreds of other instances of conflict of interest and tensions 
have not produced even an international shot: cold war has remained cold, threats to the peace have remained 
threats, issues have remained only issues.’ See also ibid., 547: ‘[T]he temptation to military intervention in 
internal affairs is largely the affliction of the few big Powers and even for them military intervention to promote 
or maintain internal wars is not always and everywhere possible.’ 
principle, valid; that is, there is really no way of knowing which is the ‘better’ one. Choosing 
either over the other can hardly be justified in objective terms and is, thus, liable to give rise 
to charges of ideological bias.  
 
**** 
 
The second standard solution involves the deployment of the WTO dispute settlement system 
(DSS). The background cultural reflex here is essentially that of a common lawyer crossing 
over into technocratic governance: the best way to resolve any given set of social problems is 
to leave everything to the wisdom of the case-law process. Eschew top-down legislative 
scenarios the same way a free marketeer would eschew economic planning, trust the 
decentralised logic of individual complaints to throw up all the relevant issues, look to the 
collective genius of the judicial profession to separate the gold from the dross, assemble the 
individual nuggets as they come – and then maybe, some years down the line, see if they 
could not perhaps be arranged together and fused into some kind of codifying document or a 
restatement.  
 
For all its intuitive familiarity to the international legal mind, in the current ITL environment 
this approach appears to be the least popular. The conventional wisdom seems to be that at 
least in the case of NTBs the weaknesses of the WTO DSS consistently outweigh its 
strengths. Of course, the argument states, it is most definitely true that most policy solutions 
worked out in the context of a judicial process will usually have a far more rigorously 
constructed reasoning basis than those which have been developed in the context of 
diplomatic negotiations. And, of course, it is also true that such solutions will frequently 
further benefit from the higher transparency and predictability of the judicial process. 
However, the inductivist philosophy at the heart of the leave-it-to-the-courts approach 
unavoidably makes it a very slow-moving process, especially when it comes to major policy 
issues – it may take well upwards of a decade before enough starting material is accumulated 
for any kind of restatement to become possible – and time in the present context is absolutely 
of the essence: 
 
Exporters facing NTBs need real time solutions. A solution that comes 2 years 
after the identification of the problem does very little to assist exporters in 
clearing their goods at the port of entry and only adds to costs and leads to a loss 
of market opportunity. The lengthy dispute settlement mechanism can … create 
considerable instability especially for a new enterprise in the exporting country.33 
  
What is more, even at the micro-level the judicial process can hardly be said to work well. It 
is a well-known fact, that the use of the WTO DSS is a very resource-intensive undertaking, 
both in terms of the amount of time it takes before an average dispute reaches resolution and 
in terms of the sheer scale of financial and legal-labour resources that the involved parties 
would have to expend to get there.  No less importantly, continues the argument, routing the 
dispute resolution process through a litigative channel by definition will typically encourage 
the participating players to assume a fundamentally adversarial attitude vis-à-vis one another, 
which, of course, is not at all conducive to the achievement of swift pragmatic resolutions 
and, indeed, under some circumstances can lead to an even greater resource wastage pattern 
(digging of the heels scenario).34  
 
                                                 
33 See ‘Resolution of NTBs through a Facilitative Mechanism’, supra n.13, §5. 
34 See Fraser, supra n.4, 1041. 
Note the hidden pop psychology turn (another classical trait of ideological discourses): the 
claim about the counterproductive effects of the litigative experience, though it is couched in 
decidedly empirical terms, is backed up neither by any quotable empirical evidence nor by 
data derived from any kind of practical trials or experiments. The idea is simply parachuted 
into the argument in the form of a bold deductive assertion, having been borrowed, one 
suspects, from an apparently similar context in which the matter at hand was the study of the 
psychological impact of litigative experiences on human individuals and business enterprises 
– if it holds true for those kinds of litigants, why should it not also hold true for states? – the 
promiscuity of unreflective domestic analogism at its best.35   
 
Note also the lack of any recognition when it comes to providing account of any potential 
cultural differences between the different categories of WTO members: going by this theory, 
the litigative experience appears to have the exact same effects on German trade officials as it 
would on their Chinese or Qatari counterparts.  
 
The secret of the ideological discourse is that it always seems to work unless one knows what 
to look for to see if it doesn’t.  If one does not know what is missing from its construction – 
the empirical evidence, the justification for the domestic analogy, the recognition of cultural 
differences – the anti-DSS argument offered by the HM discourse reads actually quite 
elegantly: 
 
While it should be recognized that the WTO’s [DSS] is a distinct improvement 
over the erstwhile GATT procedures due to its predictability and enforceability, as 
well as being one of the most efficient mechanisms available under international 
legal regimes, the [DSS], which works on the principles of an adversarial process, 
is expensive, and the time of up to 2 years taken for an enforceable decision, often 
frustrates the exporter’s need for a timely solution.36 
 
So far, so good, except: is it not true that a significant part of the DSS procedure does not, in 
fact, rely on any kind of adversarial dynamics? Neither the initial consultations stage, nor the 
‘good offices, conciliation and mediation ‘ stage – nothing, in fact, that is covered by Articles 
4 and 5 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding – is premised on any form of 
litigative confrontationism. What should one make of that fact?  
 
The answer might have been far from obvious under some other circumstances, but not so in 
the world of pop psychology. The thing is, explain the authors of the 2009 briefing note, 
although the consultations procedure may not look the same as a normal litigative procedure 
in reality it actually is that: ‘the formal step of submitting a request for consultations’ already 
‘frame[s] the discussion in a legal and adversarial direction’.37 The damaging effect, in other 
words, is produced already at the moment the earliest stage of the DSS process is initiated; 
there is no need to wait until the panel is established or the Appellate Body is engaged.  
 
Note again the lack of any quotable empirical evidence and the avoidance of the cultural 
variety question: once more it does not seem to matter which member states may be involved 
                                                 
35 For an overview of the bleak history of unscrupulous use of domestic analogism in international law, see 
ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? A REAPPRAISAL OF THE LIMITS OF LEGAL 
IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1986). See, in particular, ibid., 67-80 and 87-92. See also for related 
comment Akbar Rasulov, ‘Theorizing Treaties: The Consequences of the Contractual Analogy’, in CHRISTIAN 
TAMS ET AL. (EDS.), RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 74 (2014). 
36 See ‘Resolution of NTBs through a Facilitative Mechanism’, supra n.13, para. 4.  
37 See ‘Answers by co-sponsors’, supra n.23, para II.2.  
in the consultations procedure, the phenomenological effects in question – the arousal of an 
adversarial sensibility – will always be the same.  
 
Note also the latent circularity at the heart of the proposed explanation: what the 2009 
sponsors are essentially saying is that the act of starting a process that the involved parties 
perceive as a litigative process triggers in their minds an experience of this process as a 
litigative process. But of course: the act of starting something that I know is a form of 
dancing is going to lead me – because I already know that I am dancing – to realise that I am 
dancing.  
 
Note, finally, the curious attempt to equate in the latter part of the formulation ‘legal’ with 
‘adversarial’. A stickler for detail might note that while the latter concept usually describes a 
certain way of arranging the mechanics of judicial procedure, the former tends to cover a 
much broader field of phenomena, but this would be precisely to miss the whole point of 
what seems to be the implied argument: the damaging effects that were mentioned earlier are 
really a product not of the DSS itself but of the idea of law. It is not so much, in other words, 
the immediate organisation of the DSS procedure that is supposed to cause the member states 
to develop a deep-seated predilection for belligerence and an uncontrollable urge to dig their 
heels in. It is the introduction of the concept of law into their heads and the notion that their 
dispute should be resolved according to their legal rights.  
 
Thus put, the animating argument behind this part of the HM discourse may seem truly 
absurd, but, of course, that is precisely what (almost) all ideologies have in common: a 
certain fondness for fundamental absurdity and deep-seated theoretical bankruptcy. The only 
thing that separates the more successful ideologies from the less successful ones in this 
context is how effectively this combination of absurdity and theoretical bankruptcy has been 
covered up by the use of clever discursive devices.  
 
**** 
 
The third archetypal scenario recognised in the eyes of the contemporary ITL doctrine is the 
harmonization of the corresponding member states’ internal regulatory regimes. An ounce of 
prophylactic is worth a gallon of medicine. The WTO Committees and the DSS may help 
resolve individual NTB disputes after they break out, but ‘[t]he harmonization of the 
Members’ [domestic regulatory regimes] has the effect of limiting and preventing disputes on 
specific NTB measures’ before they even become possible.38  
 
How does this process work? The argument, in a nutshell, seems to go more or less as 
follows: every NTB dispute is ultimately a symptom of an underlying discrepancy in the 
respective regulatory regimes. The more similar the regulatory regimes adopted by the 
different member states are, the less likely their application in practice is going to produce a 
disproportionate effect on cross-border trade, the less likely, accordingly, their execution is 
going to raise a protectionist NTB. If the ultimate aim of the ITL enterprise is to reduce and 
eliminate the harmful effects of NTBs on international trade, the most effective strategy the 
ITL enterprise can adopt in the long run, it follows, must be the promotion of an ever-
deepening process of regulatory harmonization.  
  
                                                 
38 Fraser, supra n.4, 1036.  
Note the implied assumption behind this argument: what gives NTBs their trade-destructive 
power, on this vision, comes down essentially to a loose combination of informational 
asymmetries and a collective action problem, both of which are species of what in modern 
economics is loosely described by the broad label transaction costs. The informational 
asymmetries hypothesis proceeds from the fairly commonsensical observation that it would 
be considerably more difficult for Ruritanian toy manufacturers to find out about Arcadian 
toy safety standards and certification procedures than it would be for the Arcadian toy 
manufacturers. The collective action hypothesis, in turn, revolves around the idea that even 
though it may be ultimately in the interests of the Ruritanian toy industry as a whole to 
institute a regime of information gathering and dissemination about the Arcadian toy safety 
standards and to establish on its basis some kind of pre-certification procedure modelled on 
the applicable Arcadian regulations which could be used by the Ruritanian exporters 
whenever they need it, only very few Ruritanian toy manufacturers will find it both feasible 
and economically sensible to invest in either of these undertakings; the rest will either take a 
leap of faith and try to export their products to the Arcadian market without the assurance of 
having gone through such a procedure or will avoid exporting into that market altogether. 
Either scenario, obviously, is going to result in sub-optimal trade patterns. Hence the need for 
a global-level public institution-style solution, such as, for instance, the establishment of a 
comprehensive notification mechanism under the respective WTO Committees, or the 
promotion of an equally comprehensive programme of transnational harmonization of 
standards.  
 
Why is it important to take notice of this imaginational pattern beyond the fact that it 
confirms the presence of a strongly ideologised climate within the ITL discursive space? The 
answer, in a sense, is as old as the critical tradition itself: to a man with a hammer every 
problem that does not look like a nail is fated to remain either incomprehensible or invisible.   
 
If the general theory against the background of which the contemporary NTB debate unfolds 
is premised on the notion that to solve the problem of the NTBs one must only manage the 
question of transaction costs, then a large part of what might be called openly strategic and 
heavily politicised behaviour will simply not register within that debate’s horizon of internal 
visibility or will be received into it in a fundamentally misrecognised form. Indeed, the only 
variety of open politicisation scenario which the currently dominant theory of trade policy 
decision-making appears to be able to recognise is the classical capture-by-special-interests 
scenario. And the first thing, of course, that needs to be noted about this kind of scenario is 
that it is essentially premised on two assumptions: (i) that national governments typically 
have no capacity and no real inclination to determine the course of their political action in the 
global trade policy-setting arena independently of the respective domestic interests under 
whose pressure they act; and (ii) that the single dominant rationality at the heart of all global 
trade policy processes is the rationality of managerialism and economic calculation – as 
opposed to, say, OPEC-style or Russian-style geopolitical games as seen, for example, in the 
1970s oil crisis or in the recent cases of Moldovan and Georgian wine embargoes. A 
theoretical apparatus that is grounded in such a remarkably impoverished model of political 
behaviour (and social life more broadly) and so fundamentally predisposed towards ignoring 
the role of non-economic factors and considerations in the development of global trade policy 
can, of course, still equip its users to form relatively well-informed judgements about the 
operative logic of the international trade regime – but only up to a certain point. Beyond that 
it is bound inevitably to turn into a fundamental epistemological obstacle and thus become a 
source of serious practical impediment and danger both to these users themselves and to those 
wider publics whose lives may be affected by their choices and decisions.   
 
A somewhat different way to make the same point would be to say that the exact same 
imaginational pattern that can be seen in the present context can also be detected on a slightly 
larger scale in the case of the so-called Liberal Theory of International Relations – as 
expounded by the likes of Anne-Marie Slaughter and Andrew Moravcsik39 – and Harold 
Koh’s transnational legal process school.40 Everything that has been said about the 
miscellaneous dark sides, blind spots, and pop-science dilettantism tendencies of these 
schools,41 it follows, can be extended logically to this aspect of the NTB debate as well – and, 
by extension, to the corresponding region of the contemporary ITL consciousness too, out of 
which the HM initiative has arisen and by the internal contradictions of which its discourse is 
structured and over-determined.  
 
 
 
The Proceduralist Turn and Its Discontents 
 
 
What is the importance of all these observations? One way of answering this would be to say 
that what the discussion above shows is essentially that the emergence of the HM enterprise 
in modern ITL is an event that cannot really be understood on its own terms. It is, in other 
words, something other than what it makes itself out to be. The argument made on behalf of 
the new HM procedure by its sponsors seems fundamentally unconvincing if it is taken at its 
face value – both as a policy proposal and as a hypothesis about NTB disputes and, quite 
possibly, the ITL IDS logic more generally. What the new mechanism is supposed to 
contribute to the WTO IDS system is, in fact, neither so novel nor so radically different as its 
sponsor seek to present it: the WTO procedural framework already has all of those elements 
which the HM initiative aims to introduce within it; what is more, it is neither so inefficient 
nor so disorganised as it commonly tends to be portrayed.  
 
If it cannot be understood on its own terms, however, the question then arises: how should it 
be understood? How should we read the appearance – the coming-into-existence – of the HM 
policy exercise? My sense, dictated no doubt as much by my scholarly habits as by anything 
else, is that the most convincing answer to this would be that we should read this kind of 
‘events’ symptomatically, that is to say, as reflections, traces, and expressions of some 
broader underlying process – and not necessarily one of a ruptural nature. What could this 
process be in the present case? The answer, I think, has to be sought for the most part outside 
the immediate horizon of the present-day ITL enterprise.  
 
If we look closely at the operative dynamics animating the HM discourse, its basic self-image 
essentially seems to be that of a fundamentally technocratic enterprise pre-occupied with the 
question of process-building. The main debate at its heart is presented as an entirely apolitical 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 
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40 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 623 (1998). 
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debate about process and procedure. All the various issues, dilemmas, and aporias which it 
throws up are similarly formulated as entirely apolitical issues, dilemmas, and aporias of 
process and procedure. Even the ultimate foundational challenge towards which everything is 
orientated is consistently articulated in the fundamentally apolitical form of: ‘What is the best 
way to organise the processes and procedures of ITL IDS?’ The whole enterprise of the HM 
initiative, it seems, is, in effect, constructed as just another phase in the grand technocratic 
exercise dedicated to the improvement and optimisation of the ITL process.  
 
And yet all these presentations, formulations, and articulations, it seems to me, are ultimately 
just that: interpretative spin, flimsy appearances, carefully constructed façades – nothing 
more. The reality behind them is entirely different, a lot more complex, and a lot more 
ambivalent too. To see what that reality is, one needs first to take the proverbial few steps 
back and try to insert the HM discourse into the framework of a somewhat broader discursive 
formation than the one in whose context it has heretofore been considered: that of the 
contemporary Public International Law (PIL) system as a whole, rather than just the present-
day ITL enterprise – for it is, indeed, that formation whose operative conditions actually 
determine the productive logic of the ITL IDS debate and define the general thrust behind the 
HM enterprise. Such is the task and there exists probably no better platform from which to 
begin addressing it than David Kennedy’s International Legal Structures.42 
 
 
**** 
 
Kennedy’s starting thesis is very simple: proceeding on the assumption that the contemporary 
PIL discourse does, in fact, constitute – as most of its participants appear to believe – an 
internally coherent system, it seems it would be useful to try to comprehend the achievement 
of this coherence as a function of its underlying structure. The most intuitively obvious way 
to determine the essential contours of this structure would be to trace the various internal 
divisions of PIL’s doctrinal field as reflected in the second-order discourse produced by PIL 
commentators.  
 
Having set out with this general aim, Kennedy’s next step was to identify which of these 
internally recognisable divisions could shed the most light on the productive logic of the PIL 
discourse. After entertaining several different possibilities,43 he eventually decided to focus 
on the tri-partite split between ‘three broad categories which I termed sources, process and 
substance’.44 The logic of giving them these names did not, of course, come from a simple 
division of functions between the three doctrinal blocks:  
 
I did not decide to work with these categories because I thought they 
addressed different problems, or had developed in response to different 
historical or functional demands, or because they seemed to apply in 
different contexts. Indeed, commentators seem[] to treat them as the product 
of similar forces, and doctrines from each category often seem[] equally 
applicable to a wide range of factual situations. It was precisely this 
generalizability which suggested that they all formed part of the 
contemporary discourse of public international law.45  
                                                 
42 See DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987). 
43 See, e.g., David Kennedy, Theses about International Law Discourse, 23 G.Y.I.L. 353 (1980). 
44 See KENNEDY, supra n.42, 289. 
45 Ibid. 
 
What makes the three blocks into a single whole, in other words, is not so much the fact that 
there exists, at some abstract level, a formal division of labour between the respective 
doctrinal sub-systems. Quite on the contrary: at any given point any given factual issue that is 
submitted to a PIL analysis can lend itself to being treated through the prism of any one of 
these sub-systems simultaneously. What to one PIL practitioner, thus, may look like a 
question of substance, to another may well seem a question of process or a question of 
sources. The interchangeability of the framing perspectives in this sense constitutes a key 
defining characteristic of the PIL system for Kennedy.  
 
Each of these doctrinal groups, however, seemed to be characterised by a 
distinctive rhetorical style and self-image. Each seemed eager to differentiate 
itself from the others. Usually commentators and treatise writers complied 
by treating them distinctly in the order in which I consider[] them here. I 
decided to do likewise, partly because I was interested in examining just 
such rhetorical self-images or purports. After looking at these materials in 
this way, it has become possible to think about the overall coherence of 
public international law as a set of relationships among these discursive 
fields. Indeed, it is striking how effectively these distinctive fields, each with 
its own characteristic doctrinal structure and argumentative style, work with 
and against one another to generate and sustain an international legal 
system.46 
 
To understand how this regime of ‘working with and against one another’ is actually 
organised in practice, it is essential to take account of another very important feature of the 
PIL discursive tradition: the objective organisation of the PIL discursive structure does not 
for the most part match the projected imagery of that structure which animates its practical 
deployment. That is to say, while in the former context all three sub-systems operate as 
‘equal partners’, in the latter context the relationship between them is governed by a certain 
sense of hierarchy. Process and sources  
 
present themselves as servants of a substantive order which will be achieved 
and protected [with their help]. We expect little of process – and even less of 
sources – because we expect so much of substance. In substantive legal 
doctrine we hope to find a social fabric of resolution and peace – the wise 
constraints which keep us free. Substance should reflect and create a social 
order which can be elaborated by sources and served through process. In this 
sense, the discourses of process and sources call for and project a substantive 
normative order.47  
 
The discourse of process, in particular, seems to be dominated by this spirit of 
instrumentalism and subservience to substance. Its basic organisation, remarks Kennedy, is 
fundamentally defined by its implicit aspiration ‘to be both outcome determinative … and to 
remain open and responsive to those who participate in it – to remain neutral with respect to 
substantive outcomes’, to refrain from prejudging substance’s work.48 Drawing its legitimacy 
from the idea that it strives to create a system that is simultaneously open and closed,49 the 
process discourse thus finds itself constantly attracted towards the ethos and the aesthetics of 
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technocracy. It buttresses itself by regularly referencing, on the one hand, the incontrovertible 
authority of state consent from which it arises and which it seeks to harness and channel into 
a practical institutional reality, and by constantly invoking, on the other hand, the breath-
taking promises of the substantive regime to-come – a system of clear definite answers to 
every substantive question about the international legal right(s) and wrong(s) – the 
crystallisation of which it is meant to facilitate. The reality that is concealed by these twin 
manoeuvres, argues Kennedy, however, is that all this, in a sense, is a con job: the ideology 
of process is a regime of false consciousness, distortion, and manipulation.   
 
The discourse of substance never delivers on its grand promise. At any given point in time it 
offers to its participants the possibility of supporting several equally valid answers to any 
given question without indicating which of them should be privileged over the others. Is 
Mexico’s low minimum wage scheme an unfair ‘subsidy’ and part of a strategy that enables 
‘dumping’ on the part of the Mexican manufacturers when the export to US markets? Or is it 
rather the case that the US insistence on the observance of higher labour standards is a form 
of NTB? Both interpretations are possible; how one goes about adjudicating between them 
depends in large measure on one’s ideological preferences and unstated background 
assumptions about what is ‘good’ and ‘normal’.50   
 
The only way in which the PIL tradition knows how to escape this kind of antinomian vortex 
without stepping ‘outside law’ is by reframing the respective questions of substance as 
questions of process and sources. The implicit assumption there seems to be that whenever 
one runs into a logically irresolvable indeterminacy one should opt for that solution which 
either (a) is supported by a better/longer/more ‘hard-legal’/more fundamental-principles-
reinforcing/more authoritatively verifiable sources pedigree; and/or (b) originates in a 
better/more inclusive/more transparent/more rigidly structured/more flexible process. What 
rules of international law are part of jus cogens? Whatever the international community of 
states as a whole decides to accept and recognise as such. What does the concept of a threat 
to international peace and security mean in practice? Whatever the UN Security Council, 
while acting according to the procedure determined by Chapters V, VI, and VII of the 
Charter, decides it means. How should one understand the non-attribution requirement in the 
WTO law of safeguards? The official definition – that the alleged ‘serious injury’ in question 
should be attributable directly to the alleged ‘increase in imports’ and not some other factor – 
is so abstract and impractical – try applying this test literally amidst an ongoing economic 
crisis – it seems virtually useless. How can this problem be resolved? Again, the solution 
proposed by the ITL practice could not be clearer: the principle of non-attribution in the law 
of safeguards has effectively been converted into a series of procedural requirements (rituals 
of process) that have to be complied with by the respective investigating authority before it 
can safely apply the desired measures.  
 
The problem with such an escape strategy, points out Kennedy, however, is that, firstly, it 
threatens to bring about the disappearance of substance: ‘[o]nce substantive issues are 
presented in this way, substance discourse loses its [distinctive identity]. Any such resolution 
projects the conflict into sources or process by harnessing the substantive doctrinal scheme of 
categories to modes of authority.’51 In the second place, and far more importantly, to the 
extent to which this strategy can work at all, it can only work temporarily, i.e. until the point 
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when someone starts to recognise – as Martti Koskenniemi explains, they inevitably will52 – 
that the indeterminacy challenge is no less pressing on the other side of the fence. The only 
thing that changes when the relegated question of substance arrives in the domains of process 
and sources is the list of immediate options in terms of which the ‘new’ indeterminacy 
challenge is going to be structured. The antinomian pressure underpinning it remains exactly 
the same. Depending on the quality of the legal talent involved and the reactionary pressures 
exerted by the vested interests, the coming-to-consciousness of this process may take some 
time. Sooner or later, however, the realisation inevitably surfaces that, just like the discourse 
of substance, so too the discourses of process and sources enable their practitioners at any 
given point in time to produce several mutually contradictory and – from the strictly legal 
point of view – equally valid solutions to any given question posed before them. The only 
meaningful way the PIL tradition enables them to escape such aporias is by relegating the 
respective controversies into the neighbouring domain.  
 
And thus, explains Kennedy, the vicious circle at the root of the PIL discursive system 
gradually becomes revealed: ‘we find ourselves continually referred back [from substance] to 
process and sources while they refer us forward to substance’.53 The politics this creates has a 
highly distinct ideological signature: so long as the awareness of the vicious circle remains 
limited to a relatively narrow community of the disciplinary insiders, 
 
the rhetorical system as a whole is able to assert itself quite firmly … while 
sustaining a very humble and deferential tone. [It creates the impression of] a 
quite well articulate and complete legal order even though it is difficult to 
locate the authoritative origin or substantive voice of the system in any 
particular area. … Sources refers us to the states constituted by process and 
grounded in the violence defined and limited by substance. Process refers us 
to its origin in sources and its determination in substance. Substance refers 
us to the boundaries of process, its origins in sources and its resolution in an 
institutional system of application and interpretation. Thus, the variety of 
references among these discursive areas always shrewdly located the 
moment of authority and the application in practice elsewhere.54  
 
What is more, even though at the most abstract level the basic distinction between the three 
sub-systems may often be experienced by the respective discursive agents as something quite 
tangible and definite, the actual sets of rhetorical strategies that are encountered in each case 
seem to be exactly the same.55 There is, in short, not much that really separates the rhetoric of 
process from the rhetoric of substance and the rhetoric of sources.56  
 
For Kennedy, the main lesson that could eventually be extracted from this discovery was the 
promise of a new disciplinary imaginary: ‘If, as it seems, a rather small set of argumentative 
maneuvers and doctrinal distinctions repeat themselves in a wide variety of different contexts 
throughout public international law, it might be possible to unite the field around these 
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patterns rather than to be forced to think of them each time anew in response to different 
situations or in different doctrinal areas.’57 For us, in our present context, however, it seems 
to be something else. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
It should not be too difficult to guess where this argument goes next. The self-image 
projected by the HM discourse is grounded in a very important but entirely unacknowledged 
assumption that has come to take root in recent years across the whole field of the 
contemporary ITL enterprise. The triggering event that led to this development was the long-
term failure of, to use Kennedy’s vocabulary, the ‘substance discourse’ project in modern 
ITL. In a recent book Andrew Lang masterfully documents the various instances of this 
failure and how it has come to be realised by the actors concerned across the different areas 
of the GATT/WTO regime, from the TBT agreement to the Article XX jurisprudence.58 The 
combined effect of these developments, argues Lang, has been the emergence of what he 
describes as the ‘proceduralist turn’ in modern ITL:59 the half-unconscious decision by the 
ITL community to deploy the discourse of process as a functional replacement for the 
discourse of substance, to try to tackle, in other words, the apparently unsolvable questions of 
substance,  such as what types of non-tariff measures should be allowed and encouraged and 
under what circumstances, by reformulating them as questions of process.  
 
Looking from this angle, the underlying sensibility by which the proceduralist turn has been 
inspired appears to be grounded in a deep practical contradiction. On the one hand, it seems 
extremely naïve in its theoretical self-image: the latent message against the background of 
which it unfolds seems to be that we are only having this conversation about the NTB IDS 
process because we have not (as yet) been able to work out the correct substantive answer to 
the question of what kind of domestic regulations are legitimate and what kind are not. On 
the other hand, it also seems to be deeply strategic, not to say cynical, in its broader political 
gamble: so long as the ITL community continues to act as though a legal answer to the 
question of NTBs can be worked out, the political challenges raised for the ITL enterprise by 
everything from its determining that this might be a ‘question’ at all to endorsing the use of 
such a suspiciously elastic category as ‘NTBs’ as a legal standard can be deferred virtually 
indefinitely. What happens in the meantime under the cover of this endless deferral – what 
sort of distributive outcomes become possible, entrenched, and gradually normalised and who 
gets to benefit from that – is, of course, an entirely separate matter.  
 
The current debate about the HM initiative presents itself – and is most probably completely 
sincerely experienced by its participants – as an essentially technocratic debate about process 
and procedure. In reality, as Kennedy’s analysis of the PIL discursive system suggests, it 
functions as a discursive prism which refracts a regime of policy contestation far more 
extensive in its scope and far more complex in its real-world effects.  
 
On its surface, it presents itself as a debate which operates on the explicit premise that the 
challenges placed at its heart can be eventually resolved and thus the debate itself be brought 
to an end. The reality, however, seems to be that this is not at all the case: and not just 
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because that regime of policy contestation for which it acts as the refracting discursive prism 
is far too complex and multi-layered, but because neither the challenges themselves nor the 
debate which has developed around them are actually capable of reaching any logical, 
objective, and impartial resolution. Any termination that can be brought to them, thus, is 
liable to remain effective only so long as the underlying convergence of political interests is 
stable and functional. In the present day and age, the possibility of such a convergence 
achieving any degree of longevity, while at the same time retaining its practical functionality 
at a sufficiently high level to enable to freezing of such kind of policy contestational 
environments, seems fundamentally unlikely. The good news is that this means the services 
of ITL professionals are certain to remain in high demand. What happens under the cover of 
this good news, though, is again an entirely separate matter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
